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Abstract
This paper explores the importance of housing and mortgage market het-
erogeneity in 13 European countries for the transmission of monetary
policy. We use a pooled VAR model which is estimated over the period
1995–2006 to generate impulse responses of key macroeconomic variables
to a monetary policy shock. We split our sample of countries into two
disjoint groups according to the impact of the monetary policy shock on
real house prices. Our results suggest that in countries with a more pro-
nounced reaction of real house prices the propagation of monetary policy
shocks to macroeconomic variables is ampliﬁed.
JEL classiﬁcations: C32, C33, E52
Key words: Pooled VAR model, house prices, monetary policy transmission,
country clusters, sign restrictions.
∗We thank Johannes Mayr and Steﬀen Elstner for kindly helping us with collecting the
data. The usual disclaimer applies. The research leading to these results has received funding
from the European Community’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under
grant agreement number 217266.
†LMU and Ifo Institute for Economic Research. Email: <Carstensen@ifo.de>
‡Corresponding author. Ifo Institute for Economic Research, Poschingerstr. 5,
81679 M¨ unchen, Germany. Tel: +49(0)89 9224–1689. Fax: +49(0)89 9224–1462.
Email: <Huelsewig@ifo.de>
§CESifo and Ifo Institute for Economic Research. Email: <Wollmershaeuser@ifo.de>
11 Introduction
Modern central banks are typically responsible for the maintenance of price
stability. The pursuit of price stability requires an understanding of the trans-
mission process of monetary policy, which comprises a variety of transmission
channels that characterize the eﬀects of monetary policy on output and inﬂa-
tion. Mishkin (2007) and Muellbauer and Murphy (2008) have highlighted those
transmission channels that assign the housing market an important role in the
propagation of monetary policy shocks.
In industrial countries, the importance of housing for the transmission of
monetary policy stems from the link between the development of key macroeco-
nomic variables and ﬂuctuations in house prices (Mishkin, 2007). House prices
are aﬀected by a number of factors including income, the housing stock, credit
availability and ultimately changes in interest rates induced by monetary policy
(Muellbauer and Murphy, 2008). House price ﬂuctuations have an impact on
consumption decisions of households – via housing wealth and housing collateral
eﬀects – and residential investment – e.g. via Tobin’s q by aﬀecting the value
of housing relative to construction costs (Goodhart and Hofmann, 2008). The
importance of housing is related to the institutional characteristics of mortgage
markets, which determine the availability of housing credit and the speed of
adjustment of mortgage rates to changing money market rates. Since mortgage
markets have been deregulated continuously over the past years (IMF, 2008),
this suggests that the signiﬁcance of housing for the propagation of monetary
policy has increased.
Some of these considerations have recently been included in Dynamic Sto-
chastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models. Papers by Iacoviello (2005), Ia-
coviello and Neri (2007), Monacelli (2009), and Pari` es and Notarpietro (2008)
have shown a particular interest in understanding the role played by credit mar-
ket frictions faced by households, focussing on the inﬂuence of housing collateral
on households’ consumption decisions.1 The main result of this literature is that
1Typically, these models distinguish between two types of households: Patient households
(with a high discount factor) lend money to impatient households, which face collateral re-
quirements when asking for loans. Moreover, there are two types of ﬁrms: non-durable con-
2the presence of credit frictions (i.e., collateral constraints) ampliﬁes the propa-
gation of monetary policy shocks to the macroeconomy.
This paper empirically explores the role of housing markets in European
countries for the transmission of monetary policy. We use a pooled vector au-
toregressive (VAR) model to generate impulse responses of key macroeconomic
variables to a monetary policy shock taking special account of the reaction of real
house prices. As suggested by Canova and de Nicolo (2002), Peersman (2005)
and Uhlig (2005) the monetary policy shock is identiﬁed using the sign restric-
tions approach. The main reason for pooling our sample of 13 countries is the
short time period of the data, ranging from 1995 Q1 to 2006 Q1. We select this
period since the process of deregulation of mortgage markets has been accom-
plished mostly until the mid–1990s (Girouard and Bl¨ ondal, 2001), even though
certain restrictions still exist. Moreover, the disinﬂationary process had been
completed in most European countries in the mid–1990s and monetary regimes
had become very similar across countries, both of which is essential when it
comes to evaluating the eﬀects of a monetary policy shock in a cross–country
study.
So far, a number of papers have employed VAR models for European coun-
tries to explore the reaction of house prices to a monetary policy shock. Ia-
coviello (2002), Iacoviello and Minetti (2003), Giuliodori (2005), IMF (2008)
and Calza, Monacelli, and Stracca (2006) ﬁnd that house prices across countries
respond diﬀerently to changes in interest rates. The diﬀerences in the reaction of
house prices can be related to country–speciﬁc characteristics of national mort-
gage markets. Speciﬁcally, several institutional indicators such as the typical
duration of mortgage contracts, the loan–to–value (LTV) ratio, the existence
of equity release products and the terms of adjustment of mortgage rates vary
across countries. Countries where mortgage markets are more developed expe-
rience a higher volatility of house prices and a greater role for housing in the
transmission of monetary policy.
Although the development of mortgage markets across countries is likely a
sumption goods producers and residential (durable) goods producers. The latter can either
be directly consumed (thereby providing utility), or can be used as collateral in the credit
market to obtain extra funds for ﬁnancing consumption.
3source of cross–country heterogeneity, a quantitative comparison of the eﬀects
is diﬃcult to establish because the estimates reported are often imprecise due
to low degrees of freedom. Thus, Goodhart and Hofmann (2008) suggest using
a panel VAR model to increase the power and the eﬃciency of the analysis.
They assess the link between real output, monetary variables and house prices
for a panel of 17 OECD countries over the period from 1973 to 2006. They ﬁnd
a signiﬁcant relationship between these variables, which has become stronger
in the period from 1985 to 2006 after mortgage markets have been liberalized
substantially.
Assenmacher-Wesche and Gerlach (2008) also estimate a panel VAR model
for the same set of OECD countries over the period from 1986 to 2006. They split
their sample of countries into diﬀerent groups to assess the role of institutional
characteristics of mortgage markets for the transmission of monetary policy. The
sub–panels are exogenously determined by using a broad range of indicators that
reﬂect cross–country diﬀerences in the structure of mortgage ﬁnancing. They
conclude that institutional characteristics of mortgage markets across countries
shape the response of house prices to monetary policy shocks, but the diﬀerences
between the groups are quantitatively unessential.
Overall, the evidence suggests that housing in European countries plays a
certain role in the transmission of monetary policy, but it is diﬃcult to identify
the cross–country diﬀerences precisely. The development of mortgage markets
is likely a source of heterogeneity, however the separation of countries by means
of institutional indicators is cumbersome since (i) a general agreement on which
of the indicators are most important is missing, (ii) the classiﬁcation of the
indicators is often arbitrary, and (iii) indicators for a particular country often
point in the opposite direction concerning their role for the transmission of
monetary impulses.
To detect heterogeneities in the transmission of a structural shock in the
context of a pooled VAR model we suggest a data–driven approach that clusters
countries into disjoint groups according to the impact of the monetary policy
shock on real house prices. We split our sample of countries into two groups
– a strong reaction group and a weak reaction group – that are endogenously
identiﬁed by using a distance measure, which is determined by the absolute
4value of the diﬀerence between cumulated impulse responses of real house prices.
We compare the impulse responses of the two groups of countries to assess the
eﬀects of movements in real house prices after a change in the policy rate.
Our results show that macroeconomic variables in European countries co–
move with real house prices after a monetary policy shock, but there are signif-
icant cross–country diﬀerences. The distinction of countries according to their
house price response shows that the impact of monetary policy on real GDP
(and in particular private consumption) and the overall price level in the strong
reaction group is more pronounced. In addition, we ﬁnd that the development of
mortgage markets across countries is capable to explain the divergences in the
volatility of house prices after a change in interest rates, but other cross–country
features such as national traditions, cultural factors, the share of the housing
sector in overall economic activity, the number of employees in the construction
sector, regulations regarding housing taxes and housing subsidies or transaction
costs are also likely relevant. We derive this conclusion by recognizing that our
grouping of countries is not strictly related to the institutional indicators that
are deemed essential.
Overall, our results suggest that heterogeneity of housing and mortgage mar-
kets across countries reﬂects diﬀerences in the transmission of monetary policy,
which can be explained by the amplifying eﬀects that arise from movements in
real house prices after a monetary policy shock. Since the discrepancies are siz-
able, we conclude that monetary policy should be concerned about the inﬂuence
of house prices when setting interest rates.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the base-
line pooled VAR model for our sample of countries is presented. We generate
impulse responses to a monetary policy shock to explore the reaction of real
house prices to an innovation in interest rates. Section 3 sets out our approach
of identifying disjoint groups of countries. We discuss the institutional char-
acteristics of mortgage markets across countries, describe our methodology and
comment our ﬁndings. In Section 4, we compare impulse responses of the groups
of countries to a monetary policy shock to assess the inﬂuence of movements in
real house prices. Section 5 provides concluding remarks.
52 Benchmark VAR Model
Consider a pooled VAR model in reduced form:
Xt = c +
p X
j=1
AjXt−j + εt, (1)
where Xt is a matrix of endogenous variables, c is a matrix of country speciﬁc
constant terms, A is a matrix of autoregressive coeﬃcients, p is the number of
lags and εt is a matrix of error terms. The matrix Xt consists of four columns:
Xt = [yt pt st hpt], (2)
where (yt) denotes real GDP, (pt) is the overall price level, measured by the GDP
deﬂator, (st) is the nominal short–term interest rate, which serves as the policy
instrument of the central banks and (hpt) are real house prices – i.e. nominal
house prices deﬂated with the GDP deﬂator. Each column is a stacked vector
of country variables, consisting of M · T rows, where M denotes the number of
countries and T is the number of observations corrected for the number of lags
p.
The VAR model is estimated via Bayesian methods using quarterly data
for 13 European countries taken from the OECD over the period from 1995Q1
to 2006Q4.2 Our sample of countries comprises Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden and the United Kingdom. All variables are in logs – except for the
nominal short–term interest rate, which is expressed in percent – and linearly de–
trended. The matrix of constant terms c comprises individual country dummies
that account for possible heterogeneity across the units. We use a lag order of
p = 3, which ensures that the residuals are free of ﬁrst–order serial correlation.3
Based on the VAR model (1) we generate impulse responses of the variables
to a monetary policy shock. As in Canova and de Nicolo (2002), Peersman
2Appendix A provides a detailed description of the data. Since mortgage markets in
European countries experienced an extensive phase of liberalization (IMF, 2008), which started
in the early 1980s and ended in the mid 1990s (Girouard and Bl¨ ondal, 2001), we decided to
focus on the period after the process of deregulation has been accomplished.
3See Appendix B for the results of tests for ﬁrst–order autocorrelation.
6(2005) and Uhlig (2005) we identify the shock by imposing sign restrictions
that incorporate the notion that a contractionary monetary policy shock has
a non–positive impact on real output (yt), the overall price level (pt) and real
house prices (hpt) as well as a non–negative impact on the short–term interest
rate (st). While the restrictions imposed on real output, the price level and the
short–term interest rate are standard (Peersman, 2005), the restriction imposed
on real house prices follows from theoretical considerations derived from DSGE
models which incorporate a housing sector and which show that real house prices
should decline on impact after a monetary contraction rather than rise.4 For
all variables the time period over which the sign restrictions are binding is set
equal to two quarters. The restrictions are imposed as ≤ or ≥.
The advantage of sign restrictions over Cholesky or Blanchard–Quah decom-
positions is that we do not have to impose zero restrictions on the contempora-
neous or long–run impact of shocks. Short-run restrictions are typically incon-
sistent with a large class of general equilibrium models (Canova and Pina, 2005),
and long-run restrictions may be substantially biased in small samples (Faust
and Leeper, 1997). The sign restrictions approach only makes explicit use of
restrictions that we often use implicitly. Having a certain theoretical under-
standing in mind, we typically experiment with the model speciﬁcation until
the impulse responses look reasonable (Peersman, 2005). This a priori theoriz-
ing is made more explicit with sign restrictions.
2.1 Basic Estimation Results
Figure 1 shows the impulse responses of the variables to a contractionary mone-
tary policy shock, which is normalized to unity, i.e. 100 basis points.5 The solid
lines display the median of the impulse responses and the shaded areas are the
68% conﬁdence intervals. As the median and the quantiles were computed from
4See for example the papers by Iacoviello (2005), Iacoviello and Neri (2007), Monacelli
(2009), and Pari` es and Notarpietro (2008)
5The Bayesian estimation and the identiﬁcation of the monetary policy shock us-
ing sign restrictions were performed with Fabio Canova’s MATLAB codes bvar.m,
bvar chol impulse.m and bvar sign ident.m, which can be downloaded from his website
(http://www.crei.cat/people/canova/).
7all impulse responses that satisfy the sign restrictions, the conﬁdence intervals
not only reﬂect sampling uncertainty, but also modeling uncertainty stemming
from the non–uniqueness of the identiﬁed monetary policy shock. The simula-
tion horizon, which is depicted on the horizontal axis, covers 20 quarters. The
responses of real output, the overall price level and real house prices are ex-
pressed in percent terms, while the response of the interest rate is expressed
in units of percentage points at an annual rate. Notice that the immediate
responses of all variables are constrained after the impact so that little interpre-
tation needs to be given to the sign of the adjustment for the ﬁrst two quarters.
Real output falls after the monetary policy shock and remains below the
baseline value for around 16 quarters. The decline in the overall price level is
very persistent. The short–term interest rate remains above baseline for around
10 quarters and reverts to it afterwards. Real house prices display a hump–
shaped response – which is consistent with the ﬁndings of e.g. Assenmacher-
Wesche and Gerlach (2008), Iacoviello and Minetti (2003) and Calza, Monacelli,
and Stracca (2006) – and return gradually to the baseline value after around
20 quarters. Considering the responses of the overall price level and real house
prices two remarks are in order. First, nominal house prices – calculated as real
house prices plus the overall price level – decline in reaction to a contractionary
monetary policy shock. Second, the adjustment of nominal house prices is more
ﬂexible than the adjustment of the overall price level over the simulation horizon,
which means that nominal house prices are less sticky.
The forecast error variance decomposition presented in Table 1 provides some
additional information on the quantitative impact of the monetary policy shock.
Regarding the volatility of real output the monetary policy shock explains a
share of around 18% over the simulation horizon (corresponding to the median
impulse response function). Movements in the overall price level are accounted
for by the monetary policy shock in a sizable fraction, starting with 13% im-
mediately after the occurrence of the shock and continuously increasing up to
39%. Moreover, regarding the volatility of real house prices the monetary pol-
icy shock explains a share of 12% on impact of the shock, with a continuous
increase to 34% at the end of the simulation horizon. We interpret this ﬁgure
as a remarkable fraction, given that real house prices should be also aﬀected by
8Figure 1: Baseline VAR Model: Impulse Responses to a Monetary Policy Shock














Real output        































Interest rate      














Real house prices  





Notes: The solid lines denote the median of the impulse responses, which are identiﬁed from
a Bayesian vector–autoregression with 1000 draws using sign restrictions; the shaded areas
are the related 68% conﬁdence intervals. Real output, the overall price level and real house
prices are expressed in percent terms, while the interest rate is expressed in units of percentage
points at an annual rate.
9Table 1: Forecast Error Variance due to a Monetary Policy Shock
Horizon Real output Overall price level Interest rate Real house prices
1 16.03 12.85 12.69 11.99
2 15.63 12.37 10.62 17.21
3 15.90 13.18 10.43 21.47
4 16.53 14.30 10.65 23.66
6 18.51 17.71 10.83 27.62
8 19.51 22.16 11.33 30.41
10 20.29 27.08 11.37 33.27
12 19.66 31.46 11.70 34.18
14 18.99 35.09 11.83 34.34
16 18.55 37.22 11.84 34.47
18 18.44 38.34 12.02 34.88
20 18.87 39.19 12.19 34.45
Notes: For all variables in the pooled VAR model the ﬁgures display the percent of the variance
in the reduced form innovation at diﬀerent horizons attributable to a monetary policy shock.
real output and price level innovations.
2.2 Alternative Identiﬁcation Scheme
We check the robustness of our results by generating impulse responses of the
variables to a monetary policy shock, which is identiﬁed by imposing a triangular
(Cholesky) decomposition of the variance–covariance matrix of the reduced–
form shocks (Sims, 1980). The ordering of variables in the matrix Xt implies
that real output and the overall price level are hit by an innovation in the
nominal short–term interest rate with a lag of one quarter, while real house
prices are aﬀected contemporaneously. The impulse responses of the variables
are shown in Figure 2 together with the corresponding error bounds.
The ﬁndings show that real output falls after a monetary policy shock, ex-
hibiting a humped–shaped response, and returns to the baseline value subse-
quently. Prices initially increase for about 8 quarters before they start to fall.
The initial rise of prices reﬂects the presence of a price puzzle (Sims, 1992), which
is also reported in related studies – see e.g. Goodhart and Hofmann (2008) –
10Figure 2: Alternative Identiﬁcation Scheme
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Notes: The solid lines denote the median of the impulse responses, which are identiﬁed from
a Bayesian vector–autoregression with 1000 draws using a triangular decomposition of the
variance–covariance matrix of the reduced–form shocks; the shaded areas are the related 68%
conﬁdence intervals. Real output, the overall price level and real house prices are expressed in
percent terms, while the interest rate is expressed in units of percentage points at an annual
rate.
11that impose zero restrictions on the contemporaneous impact of the shock.6 Real
house prices slightly increase on impact after a monetary policy shock, but the
rise is statistically insigniﬁcant. They decline afterwards, reaching their trough
after around 7 quarters, and return to the baseline value subsequently.
While the identiﬁcation strategy seems to be irrelevant for the response of
the short–term nominal interest rate, a comparison of the remaining impulse
responses with those resulting from the sign restriction approach yields some
important diﬀerences. Using the triangular decomposition the eﬀects of a mon-
etary policy shock are less pronounced and more delayed (see Peersman, 2005,
for similar results). Under sign restrictions an unexpected 100 basis point in-
crease in the policy instrument depresses real output instantaneously by around
2%, whereas the triangular decomposition leads to a decline in real output by
a bit more than 1% after two years. The maximum impact on the overall price
level using the triangular decomposition is −0.3% in the fourth year following the
shock, compared to −1.5% in the third year under sign restrictions. Similarly,
the fall in real house prices is about ﬁve times larger under sign restrictions.
Moreover, the conﬁdence bands are tighter when the triangular decomposi-
tion is applied. Since the triangular decomposition is unique, there is no un-
certainty stemming from the identiﬁcation of the monetary policy shock. Thus,
the conﬁdence intervals exclusively reﬂect sampling uncertainty, which is re-
lated to the Bayesian estimation of the coeﬃcients of the reduced–form VAR
model. Under the sign restriction approach the uncertainty surrounding the
impulse response functions increases due to the existence of multiple orthogonal
decompositions of the variance–covariance matrix, which satisfy the imposed
sign restrictions.
3 Heterogeneity Across Countries
So far, we have estimated the VAR model (1) for our sample of countries by
assuming that systematic cross–country diﬀerences can be explained by country–
6Notice that the avoidance of the price puzzle – which is hard to explain on theoretical
grounds – is one of the reason why we choose to use sign restrictions for the identiﬁcation of
the monetary policy shock.
12speciﬁc intercepts. In the following, we proceed by splitting the countries into
disjoint groups to reveal whether the economies are heterogeneous in the reaction
of real house prices to a monetary policy shock.
3.1 Characteristics of Mortgage Markets
As emphasized by Maclennan, Muellbauer, and Stephens (1998) the institu-
tional characteristics of mortgage markets across European countries constitute
a source of heterogeneity for the role of housing in the transmission of monetary
policy. Some key characteristics are summarized in Table 2, which depicts a
number of institutional indicators that potentially have a bearing on the sen-
sitivity of house prices to a change in interest rates (Calza, Monacelli, and
Stracca, 2006).
Heterogeneity in the depth of mortgage markets across European countries
is reﬂected by the volume of mortgage credit relative to GDP, which varies
considerably. In the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Denmark the ratios
are relatively high, ranging between 111% and 67%, while Italy, Austria and
France report the lowest ratios.
13Table 2: Institutional Characteristics of Mortgage Markets
Mortgage Average Typical Mortgage Reﬁnancing Interest Mortgage
Debt Typical Term LTV Ratio Equity (fee–free Rate Market
(% of GDP) (years) (in %) Withdrawal prepayment) Adjustment Index
Austria 20 25 60 No No Mainly Fixed 0.31
Belgium 31 20 83 No No Mainly Fixed 0.34
Denmark 67 30 80 Yes Yes Mainly Fixed 0.82
Finland 38 17 75 Yes No Mainly Variable 0.49
France 26 15 75 No No Mainly Fixed 0.23
Germany 52 25 70 No No Mainly Fixed 0.28
Ireland 53 20 70 Limited No Mainly Variable 0.39
Italy 15 15 50 No No Mainly Fixed 0.26
Netherlands 111 30 112 Yes Yes Mainly Fixed 0.71
Portugal 53 28 75 No – Mainly Variable –
Spain 46 20 80 Limited No Mainly Variable 0.40
Sweden 54 25 85 Yes Yes Mainly Variable 0.66
United Kingdom 73 25 70 Yes Limited Mainly Variable 0.58
Sources: IMF (2008), Calza, Monacelli, and Stracca (2006) and Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004).
1
4The access of households to mortgage credit depends on several factors
(IMF, 2008), such as the standard length of mortgage loan contracts, the typical
loan–to–value (LTV) ratio, the ability of mortgage equity withdrawals and the
capability to prepay mortgages without fees. Longer mortgage debt contracts
keep the ratio between debt services and income aﬀordable. High LTV ratios
allow households to take out more debt, while the ability to borrow against ac-
cumulated home equity allows households to tap their housing wealth directly.
The possibility of early repayment enables households to reﬁnance their mort-
gage debt in the event of an interest rate decline. Finally, the composition of
mortgages between variable–rate and ﬁxed–rate is also potentially important
(Tsatsaronis and Zhu, 2004). Mortgage debt contracts designed with variable
mortgage rates lower the debt burden of households when short–term interest
rates decline, but at the expense of a higher burden when short–term interest
rates rise.
The IMF (2008) distinguishes the development of mortgage markets across
countries by means of a synthetic mortgage market index to exploit the diver-
sity in explaining the role of housing for the transmission of monetary policy.7
The index is constructed as a simple average of several institutional indicators
and lies between 0 and 1, yielding that higher values reﬂect a high degree of
development, while lower values indicate that the development is minor.8
According to the IMF (2008), mortgage markets in Denmark, Sweden and
the Netherlands appear most developed, which suggests a high potential role for
housing in the transmission of monetary policy. In these countries the standard
length of mortgage debt contracts is around 30 years, the typical LTV ratios are
about 80% and mortgage products speciﬁcally designed for equity withdrawals
are widely marketed. In contrast mortgage markets in Austria, France, Germany
and Italy appear less developed, as the typical LTV ratios ranges only between
50% to 70% and the ability of mortgage equity withdrawals is widely missing.
7Our discussion on the separation of countries refers mainly to the results of the IMF (2008),
but we are aware of a number of studies – see Giuliodori (2005), Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004)
and Calza, Monacelli, and Stracca (2006), among others – that proceed along similar lines.
These studies classify countries into homogenous groups taking account of several institutional
indicators. Compared to the results of the IMF (2008), the outcome is akin.
8See IMF (2008) for details on the construction of the mortgage market index.
15Nevertheless the distinction of countries by means of institutional indicators
is disputable (Assenmacher-Wesche and Gerlach, 2008). First, the selection of
the indicators is subjective. Vagueness prevails in the decision on which of the
indicators are relevant. Second, the indicators are compiled arbitrarily. For
instance a considerable degree of judgement is required – see ECB (2003) – to
decide on the relevant LTV ratios (using the average ratio or the maximum
ratio), to assess whether restrictions on early repayment fees are implemented
or to evaluate whether mortgage rates are variable or ﬁxed because both terms
often coexist. Third, indicators for a particular country often point in the op-
posite direction concerning their role for the transmission of monetary impulses.
While in Belgium, for example, the typical LTV ratio is above average, suggest-
ing a relatively strong impact of interest rate changes on GDP, the prevalence of
ﬁxed–rate debt contracts or the impossibility of borrowing against home equity
for consumption rather attenuate the transmission of monetary policy shocks.
Since the classiﬁcation of countries on the basis of institutional indicators suﬀers
from these shortcomings, we decide to proceed by using an alternative approach,
which lets the data decide whether housing and mortgage market heterogeneity
is relevant for monetary policy transmission.
3.2 Country Clusters
Instead of following Assenmacher-Wesche and Gerlach (2008) and dividing our
sample of countries a priori according to the country–speciﬁc institutional char-
acteristics, we split our panel into two disjoint sub–panels – a strong reaction
group and a weak reaction group – by focusing on the response of real house
prices to a monetary policy shock. Since our approach is novel, we describe the
methodology more explicitly.
3.2.1 Methodology
In principle, one can think of the reaction of real house prices to a monetary
policy shock as a general function of the country–speciﬁc housing and mortgage
market characteristics. This implies that the VAR parameters depend on these
characteristics and, hence, the impulse responses diﬀer from country to country.
16Therefore, countrywise estimation would be optimal. Unfortunately, the precise
estimation of impulse response coeﬃcients within the VAR framework requires
a relatively large number of observations. Since for the reasons outlined above
a sensible sample does not start before 1995, we need to construct country
panels in order to increase the number of observations by using the cross–section
dimension. To facilitate an easy distinction between such country panels, we
consider only two of them, namely a strong reaction group and a weak reaction
group. Hence, the question we have to answer in this section is how to allocate
the countries in our sample to one of these two groups. This is achieved in three
steps.
1. Step: Deﬁne and Estimate the Distance between Sup–panels To
quantify the diﬀerence between any two sub–panels of countries, we need to
deﬁne a distance measure. As we are interested in the diﬀerent impulse responses
of real house prices after a monetary policy shock, we use
d =







￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
, (3)
where α1i and α2i are the median responses of real house prices of the ﬁrst and
second sub–panel, respectively, i periods after the occurrence of the shock. We
consider the responses of up to q = 2 lags, which corresponds to the time period
over which the sign restrictions are binding. Hence, the distance measure in
expression (3) reﬂects the absolute value of the diﬀerence between the cumulated
impulse responses over the ﬁrst two quarters.
At ﬁrst sight, it is now straightforward to allocate each country to either the
strong reaction group or the weak reaction group. One can simply estimate all
possible pairs of sub–panels and choose the pair with the largest distance. This
approach resembles a cluster algorithm, where the number of clusters is ﬁxed and
the distance between the cluster centers (i.e., the impulse response coeﬃcients)
is maximized. However, we have to bear in mind that the impulse response
coeﬃcients are not observed but estimated. Hence, choosing the maximum
distance pair only would contaminate the choice by a considerable portion of
randomness. In fact, we ﬁnd that there a many diﬀerent pairs of sub–panels
that exhibit similar distance measures.
17Therefore, we proceed as follows. We estimate pooled VAR models for all
possible pairs of sub–panels, which contain at least three countries to ensure
enough degrees of freedom for each sub–panel.9 Overall the number of pairs
of sub–panels amounts to 4004.10 For all pairs of sub–panels we generate im-
pulse responses to a monetary policy shock, which is identiﬁed by imposing sign
restrictions, and calculate the distance measure.
2. Step: Select Pairs of Sub–panels with Signiﬁcant Distance Measure
Then, we identify all pairs of sub–panels that exhibit a signiﬁcant distance
measure, where signiﬁcance is detected as follows. Assume that the estimated
impulse response coeﬃcients b α1i and b α2i asymptotically follow a normal distri-
bution. Then the sums of the coeﬃcients considered for the distance measure,
denoted by b s1 =
Pq
i=1 b α1i and b s2 =
Pq
i=1 b α2i, are also asymptotically normal.
Under the null hypothesis that all pairs of sub–panels are identical and have the
same sum of population coeﬃcients s =
Pq
i=1 αi, the only systematic diﬀerence
in the estimation results is the size of the panel from which they are estimated.
The sums of the estimated coeﬃcients should be approximately distributed
as:












where N1 is the size of the ﬁrst sub–panel, N2 is the size of the second sub–
panel, T is the number of observations corrected for the number of lags p in the
VAR model and σ2 is the population variance that is assumed to be constant
across countries. Furthermore, assuming that the countries are independent, we
can apply a classical two–sided diﬀerence test using the statistic: d = b s1 − b s2.
9As before the VAR models contain the same set of variables – real output, the overall
price level, the short–term interest rate and real house prices – and a lag length of p = 3.
10Notice that in our panel the total number of disjoint pairs of sub–panels amounts to
4096 (= 213/2). Given that we consider only pairs of sub–panels containing at least three
countries, this reduces the number of pairs to 4004, since there are one combination without
any country, 13 combinations with only one country and 78 combinations – (12×13)/2 – with
two countries.
18Under the null hypothesis, the statistic is approximately normally distributed
with mean zero and variance:
Var(d) = σ
2/(N1T) + σ
2/(N2T) = (1/N1 + 1/N2)σ
2/T. (6)
Since σ2 is unknown, we estimate the population variance from expression (6)
by noting that:
σ
2 = TVar(d)/(1/N1 + 1/N2), (7)
where the sample variance of the distance measure Var(d) is calculated from the
numerous realizations of d. Given the estimate of σ2, we construct a t–statistic
and compare it with the corresponding 95% critical value of the t–distribution.
As a result, we have identiﬁed all those pairs of sub–panels that are signif-
icantly diﬀerent from each other. If there was no signiﬁcant diﬀerence at all,
we would conclude that all countries show the same house price response to a
monetary policy shock and terminate the analysis here. However, we ﬁnd 1900
signiﬁcant distance measures. In contrast to using only the maximum–distance
pair, we thus consider all the diﬀerent ways to split the panel of countries into
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent sub–panels. Thereby, we alleviate the problem that the
impulse response coeﬃcients, and hence the distance measure, are subject to es-
timation uncertainty. However, this approach in turn raises the question how to
allocate a single country to either the strong reaction group or the weak reaction
group.
3. Step: Allocate each Country to either the Strong or the Weak
Reaction Group The allocation problem is tackled in the ﬁnal step. Using
the pairs of sub–panels with a signiﬁcant distance measure we calculate the
frequency that a speciﬁc country belongs to the sub–panels with the stronger
reaction of real house prices to a monetary policy shock. If this frequency
is above a threshold that is determined below, then the respective country is
allocated to the strong reaction group, otherwise it is allocated to the weak
reaction group.
The idea behind this rule is as follows. Assume there are three “true” strong
reaction countries. Then we should expect that the distance measure is maxi-
mized when these three countries are put into one sub–sample and all the others
19in the other sub–sample. However, due to sampling error, a diﬀerent pair of sub–
samples may actually exhibit the largest distance. Using our approach, we may
at least expect to ﬁnd each of the three strong reaction countries to be more
often in the strong reaction sub–sample than any of the other countries.
To accomplish this, we now derive the threshold for the frequency that a
speciﬁc country belongs to the strong reaction sub–panels. From the previous
step we know which pairs of sub–samples are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from each
other. Now we count how many times each country is in a strong reaction sub–
sample. A priorily, each country has the same chance to be a strong reaction
country. Hence, under this null hypothesis there is, for each pair of sub–panels,
a 50 percent chance that a speciﬁc country is in the strong reaction sub–panel.
Now assume that there are a total of Nc diﬀerent pairs of sub–panels of which
n exhibit a signiﬁcant distance measure. Then, for each country, the number
of times it is in the strong reaction sub–panel resembles a random experiment,
where n draws without replacement are taken from a population of size Nc that
is composed of 50 percent white (=strong reaction) and 50 percent black (=weak
reaction) elements. Accordingly, the frequency x – that a particular country is
found to be in the strong reaction group – follows a hypergeometric distribution:
f(x;Nc,Nc/2,n), where the number of pairs Nc depends on the total number of
countries M and the minimum size of a sub–panel.11
Finally, from the hypergeometric distribution we derive a 95% critical value
for the frequency that a particular country belongs to the strong reaction group.
If any country is selected more often, it is unlikely that this is due to pure
chance. Hence, we allocate these countries to the strong reaction group. All
other countries are allocated to the weak reaction group.
11Let us denote the the minimum size of a sub–panel by m. Then the number of possible







. In our case, with M = 13
countries and a minimum sub–panel size of m = 3, we have Nc = 8008 pairs. Of these
pairs, we have to estimate only 8008/2 = 4004 because, e.g., the ordering of the pair A =
{1,2,3,4,5,6},B = {7,8,9,10,11,12,13} or A = {7,8,9,10,11,12,13},B = {1,2,3,4,5,6} is
irrelevant, while ex ante either A or B could be the strong reaction sub–panel.
203.2.2 Identiﬁed Country Groups
The separation of countries according to the above steps leads to two disjoint
sub–panels that depart in the reaction of real house prices to a monetary policy
shock. Figure 3 plots the relative frequency of belonging to the strong reaction
group and the weak reaction group – as measured by means of the cumulative
impulse responses of real house prices over the ﬁrst two quarters – together with
the critical value of the hypergeometric distribution, which amounts to 51.63%.
Figure 3: Frequency of Belonging to the Strong Reaction Group























Notes: The bars depict the frequency of belonging to the strong reaction group in percent.
Out of the total of 4004 pairs of sub–panels, the number of disjoint sub–panels n, which show
a signiﬁcant distance measure, amounts to 1900 (b =100%). The horizontal line shows the
critical value of the hypergeometric distribution, which amounts to 51.63%. If the frequency
is greater or equal than the critical value, the frequency with which a country appears in the
strong reaction group is signiﬁcant.
The classiﬁcation of countries yields that Ireland, Sweden, Spain, the Nether-
lands, the United Kingdom and Denmark are settled in the strong reaction group,
as in these countries the reaction of real house prices to a monetary policy shock
21is signiﬁcantly more pronounced. In contrast Austria, Belgium, Finland, France,
Germany, Italy and Portugal belong to the weak reaction group because their
relative frequency is below the critical value.12
Figure 4: Comparison with IMF Mortgage Market Index
































































Our distinction of countries is roughly in line with the mortgage market index
of the IMF (2008), however some important diﬀerences are in order (see Figure
4). First, the rankings of countries are diﬀerent. We obtain for Ireland the
highest relative frequency, followed by Sweden and Spain, while the mortgage
market index assigns Denmark the highest value, followed by the Netherlands
and Sweden. Second, the composition diﬀers. We ﬁnd that Ireland and Spain
are settled in the strong reaction group, although both countries obtain relatively
12Our approach leads to the following ranking of countries as measured by the respec-
tive relative frequency: Ireland (99.16%), Sweden (69.16%), Spain (55.68%), the Netherlands
(55.00%), the United Kingdom (53.74%), Denmark (51.63%), Belgium (47.63%), Austria
(45.32%), Finland (44.37%), Portugal (37.53%), France (37.26%), Germany (36.63%) and
Italy (26.79%). Notice that the 95% critical value of belonging to the strong reaction group is
51.63%.
22low values in the mortgage market index. In turn, Finland obtains a relative
high value in the mortgage market index, although this country belongs to the
weak reaction group.
We interpret our ﬁndings as an indication that the development of mortgage
markets across countries is important in shaping the reaction of house prices to a
monetary policy shock, but additional country–speciﬁc characteristics – see ECB
(2003) – such as national traditions, cultural factors, the share of the housing
sector in overall economic activity, the number of employees in the construction
sector, regulations regarding housing taxes and subsidies or transaction costs
might also be relevant.
4 Assessing Heterogeneity across Countries
4.1 Baseline VAR models
What are the macroeconomic consequences of mortgage market heterogeneity
across countries? To address this question we re–estimate a pooled VAR model
for every sub–panel separately.13 For both sub–panels, we compare the responses
of the variables to a monetary policy shock, which is identiﬁed by imposing sign
restrictions.
Figure 5 reports the impulse responses of the variables in both groups of
countries – the strong reaction group and the weak reaction group – together
with the conﬁdence regions of the responses resulting from the estimation of
the entire panel, which are marked by the shaded areas. While the median
impulse responses of the two sub–panels are statistically not diﬀerent from the
median impulse responses of the entire panel, the diﬀerences are quantitatively
signiﬁcant. In both sub–panels real output falls after the monetary policy shock,
but the decline in the strong reaction group is twice as large on impact (−3%
versus −1.5%) and remains more pronounced for around two years. The fall of
prices in the strong reaction group is also larger on impact (−2% versus −1%)
and the price level remains below that of the weak reaction group until the end
of the simulation horizon. The reaction of the short–term interest rate to a
13Again, every VAR model is estimated with a lag length of p = 3.
23monetary policy shock is almost identical for both sub–panels, which ensures
that the diﬀerences in the responses of the remaining variables in the VAR
models are not due to a diﬀerent evolution of the nominal interest rate.14 The
reaction of real house prices in both sub–panels also diﬀers substantially as the
drop in the strong reaction group is three times larger on impact (−6% versus
−2%) and still twice as large after four quarters (−15% versus −7%) when the
house price response reaches its trough.
For both sub–panels, Table 3 summarizes the forecast error variance decom-
positions, which provide an additional insight into the diﬀerent quantitative
impact of the monetary policy shock. Movements of real output are slightly
more accounted for by the monetary policy shock in the strong reaction group,
starting with 15% in the strong reaction group and 13% in the weak reaction
group on impact of the shock and increasing up to 18% and 15%, respectively,
at the end of the simulation horizon. Regarding the volatility of prices the dif-
ferences between the two sub–panels are more obvious, as the monetary policy
shock explains a share of 17% and 7% immediately after the occurrence of the
shock, with a continuous increase to 39% and 32%. Likewise, movements in real
house prices are more accounted for by the monetary policy shock in the strong
reaction group than in the weak reaction group, starting with 14% and 8% on
impact of the shock and increasing up to 34% and 26%, respectively, at the end
of the simulation horizon.
The ﬁndings exhibit that the adjustment of the variables in both groups of
countries depart – to some extent even substantially – after a monetary policy
shock. The heterogeneity across countries seems to reﬂect the diﬀerences in
the transmission of monetary policy, which can be related to the amplifying
inﬂuence of house prices in propagating monetary policy shocks. We interpret
the discrepancy in the adjustment as sizable enough to conclude that monetary
policy should be concerned about movements in real house prices when setting
interest rates.
14As before the monetary policy shock is normalized to unity, i.e. 100 basis points.
24Figure 5: Impulse responses of country groups
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Notes: The solid (dashed) lines denote the median of the impulse responses of the strong
(weak) reaction group. The shaded areas refer to the 68% conﬁdence intervals of the entire
panel. All impulse response functions are identiﬁed from a Bayesian vector–autoregression
with 1000 draws using sign restrictions. Real output, the overall price level and real house
prices are expressed in percent terms, while the interest rate is expressed in units of percentage
points at an annual rate.
25Table 3: Forecast Error Variance due to a Monetary Policy Shock
Real output Overall price Interest rate Real house
level prices
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Horizon
1 15.08 12.77 17.07 7.20 10.80 16.66 14.11 7.58
2 16.35 11.35 14.75 9.14 9.20 14.32 22.49 13.11
3 17.33 11.97 15.43 12.21 8.63 12.82 27.25 15.66
4 17.92 12.54 16.64 14.24 8.74 11.81 29.91 18.12
6 18.47 14.72 20.62 19.01 9.25 10.58 33.48 21.55
8 18.18 16.74 25.36 22.90 9.81 10.20 34.41 23.50
10 17.55 17.25 29.90 26.00 10.92 10.59 34.79 24.74
12 16.96 16.95 33.54 28.46 11.59 10.92 34.58 25.35
14 16.63 16.07 36.09 30.55 12.23 11.23 34.34 25.92
16 16.79 15.64 37.41 31.26 12.54 11.48 33.94 25.66
18 17.50 15.37 38.00 32.18 12.83 11.69 33.85 25.61
20 18.59 15.40 38.59 32.44 12.99 12.08 33.88 26.05
Notes: For all variables the ﬁgures display the percent of the variance in the reduced form
innovation at diﬀerent horizons attributable to a monetary policy shock. (1) forecast error
variance of the strong reaction group. (2) forecast error variance of the weak reaction group.
264.2 Extended VAR Models
In order to get a deeper insight in the way the monetary policy shock is trans-
mitted to the macroeconomy, we estimate an extended pooled VAR model for
both sub–panels, which includes an additional variable that potentially plays
a role for the propagation mechanism. The matrix of endogenous variables is
given by:
Xt = [yt pt st (hp)t zt]
′ , (8)
where (zt) is the additional variable of interest, which is either given by real
private consumption, real residential investment, the mortgage rate or the real
eﬀective exchange rate. The variables summarized by (zt) are expressed in logs
– except for the mortgage rate that is in percent – and linearly detrended.
The inclusion of private consumption by households follows from the idea
that spending plans are likely aﬀected by movements in house prices due to
housing wealth and housing collateral eﬀects (Muellbauer and Murphy, 2008).
Households may increase their consumption expenditures in response to an in-
crease in housing wealth induced by a shift of house prices.15 Additionally,
households may rise their consumption expenditures because of an easier access
to credit, since an increase in house prices extends the value of collateral, which
loosens credit constraints. The strength of both eﬀects depends – inter alia – on
the sensitivity of house prices to a change in interest rates. Residential invest-
ment may be stimulated by an increase in house prices, primarily because the
value of housing rises relative to construction costs. Including the mortgage rate
accounts for the speed with which debt contracts conditions adapt to a change
in interest rates. The consideration of the real eﬀective exchange rate allows to
control for the eﬀects arising through open economies inﬂuences that might also
have a bearing on the transmission of monetary policy.
We assess heterogeneity across the two sub–panels by focusing on the reaction
15It is, however, important to note that an increase in housing wealth is diﬀerent from a
rise in ﬁnancial wealth. As housing fulﬁlls a dual role, serving as both a real asset and a
commodity yielding service, an increase in the value of housing assets causes a redistribution
of wealth within the household sector. Therefore the impact on consumption expenditure
arising through wealth eﬀects should be limited (Quelle).
27of the additional variables to a monetary policy shock.16 The impulse responses
are plotted in Figure 6, together with the conﬁdence regions of the responses
resulting from the extended entire panel, which are marked by the shaded areas.
The ﬁndings exhibit that real private consumption in both sub–panels re-
sponds diﬀerently to a monetary policy shock, as the fall in the strong reaction
group is more pronounced. This suggests that the reaction of private consump-
tion is aﬀected by the volatility of real house prices due to wealth and collateral
eﬀects. The response of real residential investment in both sub–panels seems to
be alike, except for the reaction in the ﬁrst year following the shock, which is
more vigorous in the strong reaction group than in the weak reaction group.
Mortgages rates in both sub–panels move diﬀerently. The increase in short–
term interest rates is passed through faster to mortgage rates in the strong
reaction group, yielding that the evolution of mortgage rates is very much in
line with the short–term interest rate. By contrast, the adjustment in the weak
reaction group is more persistent, indicating a slower pass–through of changed
reﬁnancing costs to mortgage rates. While this discrepancy in the adjustment
of mortgage rates might be attributable to diverging debt contract terms, it
turns out, however, that in the two sub–panels both, variable–rate and ﬁxed–
rate contracts, co–exist (see Table 2). Finally, the real eﬀective exchange rate
hardly moves in both groups after the monetary policy shock.
5 Concluding Remarks
We explore the role of housing and mortgage market heterogeneity in European
countries for the transmission of monetary policy. We estimate a pooled VAR
model to generate impulse responses of key macroeconomic variables to a mone-
tary policy shock taking special account of the reaction of real house prices. Our
sample comprises 13 countries for which we use quarterly data over the period
from 1995 to 2006.
16To be consistent with the reaction of real output, we decided to include sign restrictions
on the reaction of consumption and residential investment, which hold for two quarters. In
contrast, the responses of the mortgage rate and the real eﬀective exchange rate are left
unrestricted.
28Figure 6: Extended VAR Model Speciﬁcations
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Notes: The solid (dashed) lines denote the median of the impulse responses of the strong
(weak) reaction group. The shaded areas refer to the 68% conﬁdence intervals of the entire
panel. All impulse response functions are identiﬁed from a Bayesian vector–autoregression
with 1000 draws using sign restrictions. Private consumption, residential investment and
the real eﬀective exchange rate are expressed in percent terms, while the mortgage rate is
expressed in units of percentage points at an annual rate.
29We ﬁnd that key macroeconomic variables in European countries co–move
with real house prices after a monetary policy shock. In order to assess the
impact of housing and mortgage market heterogeneity across countries we split
our sample into two disjoint groups – a strong reaction group and a weak reac-
tion group – using a data–driven approach that takes account of the reaction of
real house prices to a monetary policy shock. This is in contrast to the existing
literature – notably to Assenmacher-Wesche and Gerlach (2008) – which typi-
cally splits the panel exogenously using a broad range of indicators that reﬂect
cross–country diﬀerences in the structure of housing and mortgage markets.
A comparison of the impulse responses of the two groups yields that quan-
titatively signiﬁcant diﬀerences exist. The reaction of macroeconomic variables
in the strong reaction group (including Ireland, Sweden, Spain, the Netherlands,
the United Kingdom and Denmark) is more pronounced than in the weak reac-
tion group (including Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy and
Portugal), which suggests that real house prices play an amplifying role in
the propagation of monetary policy shocks. Our result stands in contrast to
Assenmacher-Wesche and Gerlach (2008) who ﬁnd that institutional character-
istics of mortgage markets across countries shape the response of house prices
to monetary policy shocks, but the diﬀerences between the groups are quan-
titatively unessential. As regards the discrepancies of the responses of major
macroeconomic variables after a monetary policy shock across our groups of
countries, we conclude that monetary policy should take account of the volatil-
ity of real house prices when setting interest rates.
30Appendices
A Data Base
We use data for 13 European countries taken from the OECD over the period
from 1995Q1 to 2006Q4. The sample of countries includes Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The data comprises:
1. Real GDP: Gross domestic product, volume, market prices, seasonally
adjusted.
2. Prices: Gross domestic product, deﬂator, market prices, seasonally ad-
justed. An exception is Ireland where the consumer price index is used,
since the GDP deﬂator exhibits ... (?)
3. Short–term interest rate: Short-term interest rate in percent.
4. Real house prices: Nominal house prices provided by the OECD, deﬂated
with the GDP deﬂator, seasonally adjusted.
5. Real private consumption: Private ﬁnal consumption expenditure, volume,
seasonally adjusted.
6. Real residential investment: Private residential ﬁxed capital formation,
volume, seasonally adjusted. Since residential investment is not available
for Austria, Portugal and Spain, we used the gross ﬁxed capital formation,
volume, seasonally adjusted, instead.
7. Mortgage rates: Mortgage rates taken from the European Central Bank
(www.ecb.org).
8. Real eﬀective exchange rate: Real Eﬀective Exchange Rate Index, EUR.
B Tests for Serial Correlation
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